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essary and would not serve any legiti-
mate state interest. Id. Moreover, in 
"dysfunctional" families, where the par-
ents were divorced or the second parent 
otherwise did not participate in the 
upbringing of the child, the Court found 
that the requirement actually disserved 
the state's interest in protecting and 
assisting the minor. Id The Court noted 
that the record revealed the two-parent 
notification requirement to often result 
in major trauma to the child as well as 
the parent, and to violate the privacy of 
the parent and child even when they 
suffered no other physical or psycholog-
ical harm. Id. The Court wrote: "The 
state has no more interest in requiring 
all family members to talk with one 
another than it has in requiring certain 
ofthem to live together ... [n ]or can any 
state interest in protecting a parent's 
interest in shaping a child's values and 
lifestyle overcome the liberty interests 
of a minor acting with the consent of a 
single parent or court." Id. at 2946. The 
Court found that the separate interest of 
one parent combined with the minor's 
privacy interest outweighs the separate 
interest of the second parent. The Court 
therefore held the two-parent notifica-
tion requirement, standing alone, to be 
unconstitutional.Id. at 2947. 
The Court concluded, however, that 
the bypass procedure provided in the 
statute rendered the entire statute con-
stitutional. Id. The Court noted 
the district court's finding that the by-
pass procedure produced fear and anx-
iety among minors and that, of the 
judges who adjudicated 90% of the 
bypass petitions in 1981, none identi-
fied any positive effects of the law. Id. at 
2940. However, the Court followed prec-
edent set by earlier cases wherein the 
Court determined that statutes requir-
ing parental consent to a minor's abor-
tion would be upheld so long as they 
provided an alternative procedure 
"whereby a minor may demonstrate that 
she is sufficiently mature to make the 
abortion decision herself or that, des-
pite her immaturity, an abortion would 
be in her best interests." Id. at 2948 
(citing Planned Parenthood Ass'n of 
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 
u.s. 467, 491 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 
443 u.s. 622, 643-644 (1979)). 
Turning to the constitutionality of the 
statute's 48-hour waiting period, the 
Court recognized concerns expressed 
34 - The Law Foriun/21.1 
by the district court that such a waiting 
requirement might delay the abortion 
and thereby increase the risk of the 
abortion procedure, but found the wait-
ing period itself to be reasonable and to 
impose a minimal burden on the mother's 
right to decide whether to terminate the 
pregnancy. The Court stated: 
"The brief waiting period provides 
the parent the opportunity to con-
sult with his or her spouse and a 
family physician, and it permits the 
parent to inquire into the compet-
ency of the doctor performing the 
abortion, discuss the religiOUS or 
moral implications of the abortion 
decision, and provide the daugh-
ter needed guidance and counsel 
in evaluating the impact of the 
decision on her future." 
Id. at 2944. 
Through this decision, the Supreme 
Court has authorized states to impose 
upon a minor seeking an abortion the 
additional burden of either notifying 
both of· her parents, regardless of 
whether one is alienated or disinter-
ested, or obtaining the approval of a 
judge who has little or no knowledge of 
her circumstances. In that the Supreme 
Court has approved the mechanism of a 
judicial bypass procedure to render an 
otherwise invalid statute constitutional, 
one may only speculate as to future 
unconstitutional statutory obstacles 
which may be placed in a pregnant 
minor's path so long as similar judicial 
alternatives are prOvided. 
- Rikke Davis 
Maryland v. Craig: MARYLAND 
STATUTE ALLOWING ONE-WAY 
CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION 
TESTIMONY OF CHILD ABUSE 
VICTIMS DID NOT VIOLATE THE 
CONFRONT A TION CLAUSE OF 
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
In Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 
( 1990), the United States Supreme Court 
upheld a Maryland statute providing for 
one-way closed circuit television tes-
timony by an alleged child abuse victim. 
The decision overruled the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, which held that 
the State's showing of the necessity to 
prevent eye-to-eye confrontation was 
insufficient to invoke the statute's pro-
tection. 
Sandra Ann Craig was indicted in 
October, 1986 by a Maryland grand jury 
on various counts of child and sexual 
abuse. Six year old Brooke Etze, the 
named victim in each count had attended 
a preschool and kindergarten center 
owned and operated by Craig. 
Prior to the case proceeding to trial, 
state prosecutors attempted to invoke a 
Maryland statutory procedure that al-
lowed a judge to permit testimony of an 
alleged child abuse victim by one-way 
closed circuit television. Section 9-102 
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article provided that the trial judge 
must first "determin[e] that the testi-
mony by the child victim in the court-
room [WOUld] result in the child suffer-
ing serious emotional distress such that 
the child [could not] reasonably com-
municate." Id. at 3161 n.1 (quoting 
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. 
§ 9-102(a)( 1 )(ii) (1989)). Once such 
a determination was made, the child 
witness, the state prosecutor, and the 
defense counsel would proceed to a 
separate room while the judge, the jury, 
and the defendant remained in the court-
room. The child witness would then be 
subject to direct examination by the 
state's attorney, cross-examination by 
the defendant's attorney, and any ques-
tions the judge might wish to ask the 
child. The examination would be re-
corded bya video monitor which simul-
taneously displays the witness' testi-
mony in the courtroom. According to 
the procedure, the defendant would 
remain in communication with his at-
torney, but not with the child witness. 
Any objections made by either attorney 
would be ruled on by the judge in the 
courtroom. 
In support of its invocation of the 
statutory procedure, the state's attorney 
offered expert testimony that Brooke, 
testifying in Craig's presence, would 
have suffered the required serious emo-
tional distress such that she could not 
have reasonably communicated. Craig 
objected, arguing that the procedure vio-
lated the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The trial court rejected 
that challenge, stating that while the 
procedure took away the physical con-
frontation between the witness and the 
accuser, the statute preserves the "es-
sence" of the constitutional right. The 
procedure allowed the defendant the 
right to observe, cross-examine, and 
have the fact/finder view the demeanor 
of the witness. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3161-
62. The trial court also found that the 
evidence presented by the expert suffi-
ciently justified the finding that serious 
emotional distress impairing the child's 
ability to testify would have resulted if 
the child was required to testifY in the 
courtroom. Thus. the trial court allowed 
Brooke to testify against Craig via one-
way closed circuit television. Craig was 
convicted. and the court of special ap-
peals upheld the conviction. Id. 
Craig petitioned the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland. which reversed and re-
manded for a new trial. Although the 
court rejected Craig's Confrontation 
Clause argument. it held that the State 
made an insufficient showing of' the 
required emotional distress the testify-
ing would have had upon the children. 
thus failing to satisfy the high threshold 
required by Coy v. Iowa, 487 u.s. 1012 
(1988). Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3162. The 
United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the Confrontation 
Clause issues. 
The opinion of the Supreme Court 
initially focused on its holding in Coy v. 
Iowa. The Court stated that while they 
had held in Coy that '''the Confrontation 
Clause guarantee [ d] the defendant a 
face-to-face meeting with witnesses ap-
pearing before the trier offact[,]'" they 
had not held that there existed an abso-
lute right to a face-to-face confrontation. 
Id. (quoting Coy. 487 U.S. at 1016). The 
Coy Court expressly stated that the 
question of whether exceptions to the 
right existed were not addressed in its 
opinion. but noted that any exceptions 
"'would surely be allowed only when 
necessary to further an important public 
policy,' i.e.. only upon a showing of 
something more than the generalized. 
'legislatively imposed presumption of 
trauma ... • Id. at 3163 (quoting Coy. 487 
U.S. at 1021). 
The Court stated that "[ t] he central 
concern of the Confrontation Clause 
[was] to ensure the reliability of the evi-
dence against a criminal defendant by 
subjecting it to rigorous testing in the 
context of an adversary proceeding be-
fore the trier of fact." Id. Furthermore. 
the clause's purposes were served by the 
combined effect of the presence of four 
essential elements: physical presence of 
the witness. testimony under oath. cross-
examination by the defense. and obser-
vation of demeanor by the trier of fact. 
Id. The Court acknowledged that a face-
to-face confrontation enhanced the ac-
curacy of evidence by reducing the risk 
of falsehood or erroneous identification. 
but recognized that it was not an indis-
pensable element of the right. Id. at 
3164. If the other elements of the right 
are satisfied. the Confrontation Clause 
may be satisfied despite the absence of a 
face-to-face confrontation. Id. In sup-
port of its conclusion. the Court looked 
to the long history of the admission of 
hearsay statements against the defendant 
and concluded that to apply the Con-
frontation Clause literally would abro-
gate virtually every hearsay exception. a 
result directly at odds with existing case 
law.ld. at 3165. 
The Court. therefore. concluded that 
while the Confrontation Clause reflected 
a preference for face-to-face confronta-
tion. it was a preference that '''must 
occasionally give way to considerations 
of public policy and the necessities of 
the case [ .]'" Itt (quoting Mattox v. Uni-
ted States, 156 U.S. 237. 243 (1895 ». 
However. "a defendant's right to con-
front accusatory witnesses may be satis-
fied absent a physical. face-to-face con-
frontation at trial only where denial of 
such confrontation [was] necessary to 
further an important public policy and 
only where the reliability of the testim-
ony [was] otherwise assured." Id. at 
3166. 
The Court then turned its inquiry to 
the Maryland statutory procedure at 
issue. Significantly. they found that the 
Maryland statute. while denying face-to-
face confrontation. preserved the other 
important elements of the confronta-
tion right. Id. Therefore. the Court con-
cluded that the "use of the one-way 
closed-circuit television procedure. 
where necessary to further an important 
state interest. [did] not impinge upon 
the truth-seeking or symbolic purposes 
of the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 
3167. 
The Court next proceeded to deter-
mine what it thought to be the critical 
issue in the case. "whether use of the 
procedure was indeed necessary to 
further an important state interest." Id. 
The state contended that its important 
interest was that of protecting alleged 
victims of child abuse from the trau-
matic experience of testifying face-to-
face against the alleged perpetrator of 
such abuse. and that the procedure was 
necessary to further that interest. Itt 
The Court agreed that this was a suffi-
ciently compelling reason and noted 
that a majority of states have enacted 
similar statutes. Id. Accordingly. the 
Court held: 
[I]f the State makes an adequate 
showing of necessity. the state 
interest in protecting child wit-
nesses from the trauma of testify-
ing in a child abuse case is suffi-
ciently important to justify the use 
of a special procedure that permits 
a child witness in such cases to 
testify at trial against a defendant 
in the absence of face-to-face con-
frontation with the defendant. 
Id. at 3169. 
The Court emphasized that a finding 
of necessity must be made on a case by 
case basis. based on whether the use of 
the procedure was necessary to protect 
the welfare of that particular child. Id. 
The trial court must also find the child 
witness to be traumatized by the pres-
ence of the defendant. not just by the 
general experience of testifying in a 
courtroom. Id. Finally. the trial court 
must find that the emotional distress 
subjected upon the child by the face-to-
face confrontation would be more than 
de minimis. Id. 
Regarding the opinion of the court of 
appeals. the Court found that the lowt!r 
court had imposed unnecessarily strict 
requirements as a prerequisite to the 
finding of necessity. I d. at 3171. The 
Court opined that the court of appeals 
incorrectly interpreted Coy to require 
that the child witness be actually ques-
tioned in the defendant's presence. and 
a determination be made as to "whether 
a child would suffer 'severe emotional 
distress' if he or she were to testify by 
two-way closed circuit television." Id. at 
3170 (emphasis in original). Conver-
sely. the Court found that testimony of 
expert witnesses as to the effect on the 
child would suffice. and that actual 
observation of the effects of face-to-face 
confrontation was not necessary. Itt at 
3171. Thus. because the court of appeals 
did not base its determination of the 
absence of necessity on the lower thre-
shold found by the Court in this case. the 
Court vacated the judgment and re-
manded the case for further proceed-
ings.ld. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Bren-
__________________________________ 21.1/fheLawForum-35 
nan, Marshall and Stevens, filed a dis-
senting opinion and argued that the 
majority's holding was in direct conflict 
with the plain meaning of the Confron-
tation Clause. The dissenters attacked 
the majority's analogy to the admission 
of hearsay evidence, noting that the 
hearsay exceptions generally included a 
requirement of the unavailability of the 
declarant, a point which the majority 
seemed to ignore. Id. at 3174 (Scalia,]., 
dissenting). Concluding, the dis.sent 
stated: "The Court today has applied 'in-
terest balancing' analysis where the text 
of the Constitution simply does not 
permit it. We are not free to conduct a 
cost-benefit analysis of clear and explicit 
constitutional guarantees, and then to 
adjust their meaning to comport to our 
findings." Id. at 3176 (Scalia,]., dissent-
ing). "[T]he text of the Sixth Amend-
ment is clear, and because the Constitu-
tion is meant to protect against, rather 
than conform to, current 'widespread 
belief,' I respectfully dissent." Id. at 
3172 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
The opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Maryland v. Craig validates a procedure 
which will greatly increase the State's 
ability to successfully prosecute alleged 
perpetrators of child abuse. Perhaps 
more importantly, this opinion reveals 
the willingness of the current Court to 
look beyond the literal meaning of con-
stitutional guarantees and instead con-
centrate on the "essence" of the right, 
thereby preserving the notion of the 
Constitution as a flexible document. 
- Gregory J. Swain 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.: 
OPINIONS ARE NOT 
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT AND ARE 
THEREFORE ACTIONABLE 
UNDER STATE UBEL LAW 
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 
110 S. Ct. 2695 ( 1990) the United States 
Supreme Court held that statements of 
opinion are not protected by the first 
amendment and, therefore, are actiona-
ble under state libel law. In holding so, 
the Court reversed the Ohio Court of 
Appeals and remanded the case for a 
determination as to whether the state-
ments were true or false. 
Lorain Journal Co. published an arti-
cle authored by J. Theodore Diadiun 
(hereinafter "respondents") including 
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incriminating comments about the peti-
tioner, Michael Milkovich, a high school 
wrestling coach whose team was in-
volved in an altercation following a 
match. Milkovich and Scott, the school 
superintendent, testified at the Ohio 
High School Athletic Association 
(OHSAA) investigatory hearing and sub-
sequent trial. Both proceedings were 
discussed in a journal article entitled 
"Maple beat the law with the 'big lie,''' 
along with a picture of Diadiun and the 
words "TO says." Among other phrases, 
the article contained the following pas-
sage: "Anyone who attended the meet ... 
knows in his heart that Milkovich and 
Scott lied at the hearing after each hav-
ing given his solemn oath to tell the 
truth." Id. at 2698. Thus, Milkovich and 
Scott brought separate defamation ac-
tions against the respondents in Ohio 
State Court. Id. at 2699. 
Milkovich alleged that the article di-
rectly damaged his occupation of coach 
and teacher by accusing him of commit-
ting perjury, and that this constituted 
libel per se. Id. A directed verdict was 
granted in favor of the respondents on 
the grounds that there was insufficient 
evidence to establish "actual malice" as 
required by New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Milkovich, 
110 S. Ct. at 2699. The Ohio Court of 
Appeals disagreed and the decision was 
reversed and remanded. Id. at 2700. 
On remand, the trial court granted 
the respondent's motion for summary 
judgment, holding that the article con· 
stituted opinion constitutionally pro-
tected from a libel action. Alternatively, 
the court found that Milkovich, as a pub-
lic figure, failed to make out a prima 
facie case of actual malice. The court of 
appeals affirmed. Id 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Ohio found that Milkovich was neither a 
public figure nor a public official. The 
court also held that the statements were 
factual assertions as a matter of law and 
not constitutionally protected as the 
opinions of the writer. Id 
Two years later, the Ohio Supreme 
Court reversed its position in Scott's 
defamation action, finding that the col-
umn was constitutionally protected 
opinion Id. The Scott court, in ascertain-
ing whether the column was fact or 
opinion under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, applied the four factor 
analysis established by the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in 
Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 
(1985). Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2700. 
Those factors were "( 1) 'the specific 
language used;' (2) 'whether the state-
ment is verifiable;' (3) 'the general con-
text of the statement;' and (4) 'the 
broader context in which the statement 
appeared.'" Id. (quoting Scott v. News-
Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250, 496 
N.E.2d 699,706 (1986». 
Although the Scott court determined -
that the first two factors indicated that 
the statements at issue were assertions 
of fact, the court held that based on the 
third and fourth factors the article was 
opinion as a matter of law. Id. With 
respect to the third, "general context of 
the statement," factor, "the large cap-
tion 'TO says' ... would indicate to even 
the most gullible reader that the article 
was, in fact, opinion." Id. (quotingScott, 
25 Ohio St. 3d at 252, 496 N.E.2d at 
707). With respect to the fourth factor, 
the "broader context in which the state-
ment appeared," the court reasoned 
that because the article appeared on a 
sports page - 'a traditional haven for 
cajoling, invective, and hyperbole,' that 
article would probably be construed as 
opinion.Id. at 2701 (quoting Scott, 25 
Ohio St. 3d at 253-54, 496 N.E.2d at 
708). As a result of the Scott decision 
the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld a 
summary judgment against Milkovich. 
Id. An appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Ohio was dismissed for want of a sub-
stantial constitutional question, and the 
United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to consider the Ohio court's 
recognition of a constitutionally re-
quired opinion exception under the 
first amendment. 
The Supreme Court began its analysis 
by discussing the development of defa-
mation law under the common law. The 
Court first stressed the importance of 
allowing a person to vindicate his good 
name while affording redress for harm 
caused by defamatory statements. Id. at 
2702. 
At common law, a defamed private 
figure needed only to prove a false pub-
lication which subjected him to "hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule." Id. (quoting 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 370 (1974) (White, ]., dissent-
ing». The distinction between fact and 
